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In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The
roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the
West  were complex and nuanced.  These various  roles developed over  time but  were all
grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles
and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and
thwarting challenges to it. 
These  facets  of  Qaddafi’s  public  self  accord  with  the  model  of  “persona”  described  by
Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been
explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on
the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona
exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a
revolutionary  leader,  Qaddafi  was  engaging  in  a  form  of  public  performance  aimed  at
delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the
purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and
export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his
coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates
in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s
persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan
political  system,  the  journey  of  Muammar  Qaddafi’s  personas  demonstrate  how  political
personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.
Captain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the
leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively
bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away
with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With
this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of
political  image, Qaddafi  showed restraint  in  adopting the trappings of  office.  His  modest
promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in
practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the
temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his
rule.
High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army
officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a
basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission.
He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC)
and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of
detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi
was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular
acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until
the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he
insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes
how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a
“mission.”  Once  in  a  position  of  authority,  perpetuating  that  role  of  leadership  and
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acclamation can become the mission itself:
The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and
demands obedience and a following by virtue of  his  mission.  His
success determines whether  he finds  them. His  charismatic  claim
breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he
feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so
long  as  he  knows  how  to  maintain  recognition  through  ‘proving’
himself.  But  he does not  derive his  ‘right’  from their  will,  in  the
manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of
those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their
charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)
As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a
typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps
to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to
music  and  broadcast  as  pop  songs.  “Spontaneous”  rallies  of  support  would  occur  when
crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi
publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it  because the
people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were
paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).
 
In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the
people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This
was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading
for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything
from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may
be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy
of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering
his  revelations  to  the  Libyan people,  Qaddafi  extended his  mandate  beyond leader  of  a
revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”
The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses
on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option
for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics
and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was
evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the
country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!)
The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi
outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined
a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being
a  “state  of  the  masses”  and  formed  the  blueprint  for  Libyan  society  which  Qaddafi
subsequently imposed.
This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that
the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent
acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but
benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did
have  some control  over  their  affairs  at  a  very  local  level.  Beyond  this,  an  increasingly
complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of
veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any
individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties
and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering
even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to
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gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or
public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.
 
In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to
offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation
or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour
groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of
Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists,
financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the
Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain),
the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy
of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic
enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider
world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.
In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the
West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State.
Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At
this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf
of  the  world’s  downtrodden  colonial  peoples.  The  support  for  revolutionary  groups  was
changing to a more active use  of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time
Qaddafi  stepped  up  his  rhetoric  against  America  and  Britain,  positioning  himself  as  a
champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and
the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other,
more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary
persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.
Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing
Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to
the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the
height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing
Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by
President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the
Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary
Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a
committed revolutionary.
 
Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national
leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab
unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he
developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again
the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that
such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local
bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.
During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between
Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the
exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the
mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided
revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties,
souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put
him  at  odds  with  those  peers  more  determined  to  find  a  compromise.  Following  the
assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of
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Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.
Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself
as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took
to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the
African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for
becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.
In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at
leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the
practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to
leverage the next phase of his political transformation.
 
However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a
political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September
2001, Qaddafi  was the first  international leader to condemn the attacks on America and
pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history
as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home,
just  as  with  any  other  form  of  political  opposition.  The  pan-Islamism  of  al-Qaeda  was
anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself).  This meant the
United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing
of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program
and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight
downed over Lockerbie in 1987.
This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership
amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in
from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included
giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as
a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling
address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and
turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.
 
From the  Western  point  of  view,  performances  like  this  painted  Qaddafi’s  behaviour  as
increasingly  bizarre.  Particularly  after  Libya’s  rapprochement  with  the  West,  the  label  of
threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a
harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were
the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps
this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by
sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western
leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared
to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.
Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as
the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by
a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional
African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for
outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009
Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator
Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including
one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)
The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of
the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually
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slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic
leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in
the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished,
but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained
foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad,
including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request
to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of
Muammar Gaddafi”).
The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the
product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the
Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain
an iron grip on power for over 40 years.
 
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of
persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same
core self-belief  of  a  charismatic  leader,  but  could  be conflicting,  and often confusing,  to
observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately
led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.
His  erratic  performance at  the UN in  2009 perhaps typifies  the end stages of  Qaddafi’s
leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was
going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial
or  terrorist  inspired piece of  theatre belied the deep resentment of  his  rule.  His role as
opponent  of  the  Western  and  Arab  worlds  alike  meant  that  he  was  unsupported  in  his
attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower
was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.
What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country.
Since  the uprising climaxed in  his  on-camera lynching in  October  2011,  Libya has been
plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this
chaos  is  that  Qaddafi’s  supremacy,  his  political  philosophies,  and  his  use  of  messianic
persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.
This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not
survive without him.
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